2007 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

6-8-2007

USA v. Wilson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Wilson" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 981.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/981

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-5403

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v.
MAURICE WILSON, Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 05-CR-13-2)
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 9, 2007
Before: SLOVITER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,* District Judge
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2007)

OPINION

POLLAK, District Judge:
This appeal follows Maurice Wilson’s criminal conviction and sentencing in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On June 21, 2005, pursuant to
*

Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

a plea agreement with the government, Wilson pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, cocaine, in violation of federal law.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. On December 5, 2005,Wilson was
sentenced to a prison term of 130 months. On appeal Wilson contends that the 130month term was unreasonable and an abuse of the District Court’s sentencing discretion.
However, as part of his plea agreement with the government, Wilson waived his right to
appeal. Wilson does not challenge the validity of that waiver. Therefore, if it is apparent
that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, we will not exercise our jurisdiction to
review the merits of Wilson’s appeal. See United States v. Gwinnett, No. 06-1766, --F.3d ----, slip. op. at 6 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2007).
I.
Wilson’s plea agreement included a provision stating that he
voluntarily waive[d] the right to file any appeal, any collateral attack, or any
other writ or motion, including but not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 [sentencing appeals] or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [petition
for habeas corpus], which challenges the sentence imposed by the
sentencing court if that sentence falls within or below the [United States
Sentencing] Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines
offense level of 34, if Maurice Wilson is found to be a career offender, and
33, if Maurice Wilson is not found to be a career offender.
App. at 42–43 ¶ 7 (“Plea Agreement with Maurice Wilson”); see also id. ¶ 8 (“Both
parties reserve the right to oppose or move to dismiss any appeal . . . barred by the
preceding paragraph.”). At the change-of-plea hearing, counsel presented this plea
agreement to the District Court; Wilson stated that he understood the agreement and had
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voluntarily assented to it. Government counsel then summarized the contents of the plea
agreement (including the waiver of appellate rights), Wilson again confirmed his assent,
and the District Court accepted the agreement.
The presentence report (PSR) issued by the United States Probation Office stated
that Wilson was a career offender and that the applicable guidelines offense level was 34.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court—after ascertaining that neither party
objected to the PSR—adopted the PSR and the offense level of 34, and found that the
resulting guidelines sentencing range was 262 to 327 months. After reducing the offense
level and sentencing range based on Wilson’s cooperation with the government, and after
considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court
sentenced Wilson to a term of 130 months imprisonment.
II.
We will enforce a provision in a plea agreement waiving the defendant’s right to
appeal “if [the waiver is] entered into knowingly and voluntarily, . . . unless [it] work[s] a
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001). In
Gwinnett, we held that we have subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits of the
appeal where appellate rights have been waived, but we will decline to exercise that
jurisdiction and will affirm the sentence if we find that the appeal falls within the terms of
a valid and enforceable waiver. See Gwinnett, No. 06-1766, slip op. at 6, 10.
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III.
The waiver provision of Wilson’s plea agreement, quoted above, is facially valid,1
and Wilson does not claim that it was either unknowing or involuntary. Furthermore,
Wilson does not allege that enforcing the waiver will “work a miscarriage of justice.”
(Indeed, Wilson’s filings do not mention the appellate waiver at all.) We find the waiver
valid and enforceable.
In addition, we find that Wilson’s appeal falls squarely within the terms of the
waiver provision. Wilson’s right to appeal was preserved only if his sentence failed to
“fall[] within or below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines
offense level of 34.” App. at 42–43 ¶ 7. Wilson does not dispute that the sentencing
judge correctly found that guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months. The sentence
imposed was 130 months, far below the guidelines range. Accordingly, “we are satisfied
that the current appeal is within the scope of [Wilson’s] waiver, that the waiver was
knowing and voluntary, and that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of
justice.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1329 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per
curiam).
*

*

*
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*
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That is, the plea agreement is in the standard form, was entered into by the defendant
after an opportunity to consult with his attorney, bears the signature of the defendant, and
was agreed to and adopted by both parties and by the District Court at the change-of-plea
hearing.
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For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

